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THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND MUNICIPAL LAND-USE PLANNING
FOR LIMITATION OF RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT
Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma,
375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
The city of Petaluma, California, adopted a plan to curb demographic
and market growth of population and housing.1 The plan limited to 500
the number of new housing units that would be approved annually for
construction and established an urban extension line, beyond which the
city would refuse to annex territory or extend city facilities for at least
twenty years.2 The city sought the cooperation of the county and the
Local Agency Formation Commission3 to inhibit residential develop-
ment in the area outside the urban extension line.4 Two landowners
and the Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County brought
suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the
plan, and the court held: The Petaluma Plan violates the constitutional
right to travel of those persons prevented from moving into Petaluma. 5
1. The purpose of the growth limitation plan is stated in the preamble to the Offi-
cial Statement of Development Policy for the City of Petaluma: "'In order to protect
its small town character and surrounding open spaces, it shall be the policy of the City
to control its future rate and distribution of growth."' Construction Indus. Ass'n v.
City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 576 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
2. id.
3. The Local Agency Formation Commission is an administrative commission cre-
ated under CAL. Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 54780 (Deering 1974) for the purposes, among
others, of discouraging urban sprawl and encouraging the orderly formation and devel-
opment of local governmental agencies. Id. § 54774. It is authorized to review, and
approve or disapprove, proposals for local government organization. Id. § 54790. For
a discussion of administrative boundary review commissions see D. MANDELKER, MAN-
AGING Ouo URBAN ENVIRONMENT 380-88 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as MANDELKER].
4. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 576 (N.D.
Cal. 1974).
5. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 586 (N.D. Cal.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, Civil No. 74-2100 (9th Cir., Aug. 13, 1975). Reversal
was based on the court of appeals' determination that the plaintiffs did not have standing
to raise the right-to-travel issue, and on holdings adverse to plaintiffs on due process and
commerce clause arguments not reached by the district court. On the question of
standing, the court of appeals suggested that the right-to-travel issue could be raised by
the proper plaintiffs, "those ... whose mobility is impaired." Civil No. 74-2100 (9th
Cir.) at 9. But the plaintiffs in Petaluma, although they satisfied the standing require-
ment of "injury in fact," did not meet the "zone of interest" requirement:
234
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The Supreme Court first recognized the existence of a right to travel in
The primary federal claim upon which this suit is based-the right to travel or
migrate-is a claim asserted not on the appellees' own behalf, but on behalf of
a group of unknown third parties allegedly excluded from living in Petaluma.
Although individual builders, the Association, and the Landowners are admit-
tedly adversely affected by the Petaluma Plan, their economic interests are
undisputedly outside the zone of interest to be protected by any purported
constitutional right to travel.
Id. at 8. Moreover, the plaintiffs did not come within any of the exceptions to the rule
that parties to a suit may not assert the rights of third persons. Id. at 8-9.
For its assertion that some plaintiffs would have standing to raise the right-to-travel
issue the court of appeals relied on Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), which "left
open the federal court doors for plaintiffs who have some interest in a particular housing
project and who, but for the restrictive zoning ordinances, would be able to reside in the
community." Civil No. 74-2100 (9th Cir.) at 9.
In Warth, some of the petitioners alleged that they were members of racial and
ethnic minorities who had tried unsuccessfully to find housing within the municipality
whose zoning ordinance was being challenged as exclusionary. 95 S. Ct. at 2207. They
were denied standing because they had failed to
allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the re-
spondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that they
would have been able to purchase or lease in Penfield and that, if the court
affords the relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed.
Id. at 2208. The assertion that enforcement of the zoning ordinance against third parties
such as builders and developers precluded the availability of housing to the low-income
and minority group plaintiffs did not demonstrate that projects contemplated by those
third parties "would have satisfied petitioners' needs at prices they could afford, or that,
were the court to remove the obstructions attributable to respondents, such relief would
benefit petitioners." Id. at 2209. Hence, plaintiffs must be able to allege that they have
an interest in a particular housing project and that the restrictive ordinance is responsible
for preventing them from moving into the municipality. Thus the Court in Warth dis-
tinguished cases such as Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d
1208 (8th Cir. 1972), that gave standing to "low-income, minority group plaintiffs" on
the ground that "[in those cases . . . the plaintiffs challenged zoning restrictions as
applied to particular projects that would supply housing within their means, and of which
they were intended residents." 95 S. Ct. at 2209.
But the Warth opinion suffers from circularity. Where an exclusionary zoning
ordinance antedates the initial site-acquisition and planning stages of development (the
ordinance in Park View Heights did not), the Warth rule "tosses out of court almost
every conceivable kind of plaintiff who could be injured by the activity claimed to be
unconstitutional." Id. at 2216 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The petitioners who would
have undertaken development of housing projects within the municipality had suffered
no injury because the zoning ordinance had prevented the investment of money or the
initiation of any current projects or proposals that would be "delayed or thwarted." Id.
at 2213-14. Since those who would have undertaken construction projects were pre-
cluded from doing so, there were no specific projects in which the individual low-income
and minority group plaintiffs could allege an interest and thus gain standing to challenge
the ordinance. It would seem, in other words, that where an exclusionary zoning
ordinance is in existence before any steps are taken toward development of a housing
project, neither prospective developers nor prospective residents of the project will suffer
the requisite injury to give them standing. As Justice Brennan stated in dissent:
In effect, the Court tells the low-income-minority and building companyhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/17
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Crandall v. Nevada.' The State of Nevada had imposed a tax on every
person leaving the State in a vehicle for hire. Invalidating the tax, the
Court held that the power to impose it was inconsistent with the right of
citizens to pass freely through every part of the country.7 The issue
of state legislation inhibiting the interstate movement of persons reap-
peared in Edwards v. California,8 in which the Court struck down a stat-
ute making it a misdemeanor knowingly to bring an indigent into the
state. Although the majority opinion relied on the commerce clause,'
plaintiffs they will not be permitted to prove what they have alleged-that
they could and would build and live in the town if changes were made in the
zoning ordinance and its application-because they have not succeeded in
breaching, before the suit was filed, the very barriers which are the subject of
the suit.
Id. at 2217.
The right-to-travel argument analyzed in this Comment is not precluded by the
Supreme Court decision in Warth-it was one of the arguments raised by the plaintiffs
below, Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187, 1190 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974), but the Supreme Court
did not reach the merits of any of the claims pressed. For the same reason, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Petaluma does not foreclose assertion of the
right to travel. Nevertheless, the restrictive standing requirements imposed by the
Warth opinion on plaintiffs seeking to challenge zoning ordinances may render the
"open federal door" noted by the court of appeals in Petaluma more of an illusion than
a reality.
6. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). Earlier cases had suggested in dissent or dicta
the existence of a constitutionally protected right to travel. These courts considered the
right to be one of the privileges and immunities protected under U.S. CoNST. art. IV,
§ 2. E.g., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissent-
ing); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Crandall,
however, was the first case in which the Court actually based its decision on the right
to travel.
7. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 49, quoting Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282, 492
(1849) (Taney, CJ., dissenting). The Court's opinion did not indicate a specific con-
stitutional basis for the right to travel. Rather, it discussed the right of the federal gov-
ernment to call citizens to the Capital and the duty of citizens to respond. And it noted
that the citizen's correlative right to go to the seat of Government "is in its nature inde-
pendent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it."
Id. at 44. But in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869), decided shortly
after Crandall, the Court stated in dictum that the privileges and immunities clause
"gives [citizens] the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them .
8. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
9. The Court held that large-scale interstate migration of poor people is a national
concern not admitting of state regulation. Id. at 175-76. In the course of its opinion
however, it made the following statement:
inhere are . . . boundaries to the permissible area of State legislative activity
... . And none is more certain than the prohibition against attempts on the
part of a single State to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them
by restraining the transportation of persons and property across its borders. It
is frequently the case that a State might gain a momentary respite from the
pressure of events by the simple expedient of shutting its gates to the outsideWashington University Open Scholarship
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four Justices based their concurrence in the decision on the constitution-
al right to travel.' 0 More recently, in Shapiro v. Thompson,1 the Court
announced that only a compelling state interest can justify a legislative
classification that deters or penalizes the exercise of the right to travel.' 2
At issue in Shapiro were state statutes requiring as a condition of eligibil-
ity for welfare payments that a person have been a resident of the state
for at least a year. The Court held that the one-year residence require-
ment violated the equal protection clause13 by penalizing needy people
world. But, in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "The Constitution was
framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range.
It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several States must sink
or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union
and not division."
Id. at 173-74, quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
10. 314 U.S. at 177-86. Mr. Justice Jackson argued in his concurring opinion:
This Court should.., hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of
the United States, protected from state abridgement, to enter any state of the
Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent
residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof.
Id. at 183 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion he stated:
That choice of residence was subject to local approval is contrary to the ines-
capable implications of the westward movement of our civilization.
Even as to an alien who had "been admitted to the United States under the
Federal law," this Court, through Mr. Justice Hughes, declared that "He was
thus admitted with the privilege of entering and abiding in the United States,
and hence of entering and abiding in any State in the Union.". . . Why we
should hesitate to hold that federal citizenship implies rights to enter and abide
in any state of the Union at least equal to those possessed by aliens passes
my understanding. The world is even more upside down than I had supposed
it to be, if California must accept aliens in deference to their federal privileges
but is free to turn back citizens of the United States unless we treat them as
subjects of commerce.
Id. at 183-84, quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915).
11. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
12. Id. at 634, 638.
13. The durational residence requirement classified needy persons according to
whether they had been state residents for more or less than a year. Since it was on
that basis that they were granted or denied the welfare aid necessary for subsistence,
the statutory scheme created an invidious classification. Id. at 627. The statutory pur-
pose to deter the migration of poor people into the state was constitutionally impermissi-
ble, as was the limitation of welfare benefits to those who, as longtime residents, were
considered to have contributed taxes to the state. The classification therefore could not
be justified as a method of preserving the fiscal integrity of the state welfare program,
Id. at 627-31. Furthermore, certain administrative and related governmental objectives
advanced as justifying the durational residence requirement, while legitimate, did not rise
to the level of compelling state interests. Nor was the statutory classification even rea-
sonably related to the achievement of these interests. The argument that the require-
ment facilitated planning of the welfare budget was unfounded, since the residence of
applicants could be determined by independent means. Also, there were less drastic
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/17
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who had recently exercised their fundamental right to travel.14 Finally,
the Court has also noted a possible constitutional distinction between
interstate and intrastate travel, 5 a distinction which suggests the ques-
methods available to minimize the possibility that recipients would fraudulently receive
payments simultaneously from more than one jurisdiction. Finally, the argument that
the waiting period encouraged early entrance into the labor force would be equally valid
with regard to long term residents. Id. at 633-38.
14. As pointed out in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974),
the Court has not clarified the degree of impact required to constitute a penalty on the
exercise of the right to travel.
Although any durational residence requirement impinges to some extent on
the right to travel, the Court in Shapiro did not declare such requirements to
be per se unconstitutional. The Court's holding was conditioned ...by the
caveat that some "waiting-period or residence requirements . . . may not be
penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel."
Id. at 256 (emphasis original). Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App.2d 430, 78
Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970), upheld a requirement
that a person have been a resident of the State of California for a year in order to be
eligible to pay resident tuition at state universities. In support of its decision, the court
said that education could not be put on the same level as the basic necessities of life
that were denied to newcomers under the welfare statutes at issue in Shapiro. There-
fore, the year of residency required in order to be eligible to pay the lower resident tui-
tion rates did not impinge on the right of interstate travel, nor did it have a deterrent
effect on the exercise of that right. Because the legislative classification was reason-
ably related to the legitimate objective of sound fiscal management of state universities,
it could be upheld. See generally Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Starns v. Mal-
kerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
15. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). In this case, the
Court applied the Shapiro formula to strike down a state statute requiring one year of
residence in a county as a condition to receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medi-
cal care at the county's expense. The county sought to distinguish the county residence
requirement from the state residence requirements in Shapiro on the ground that the
former penalized intrastate rather than interstate travel. The Court responded that
"[e]ven were we to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate
travel, a question we do not now consider," the distinction would be irrelevant since the
individual appellant had moved into Maricopa County from out of state. The Court
added that "[w]hat would be unconstitutional if done directly by the State can be no
more readily accomplished by a county at the State's direction." Id. at 255-56.
Some state and lower federal courts have decided that there is a right of intrastate
travel. E.g., King v. Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Well-
ford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1972); Sturrup v. Mahan, - Ind. App.
-, 290 N.E.2d 64 (1972), modified, 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974); Donnelly v. City of Man-
chester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971); Josephine County School Dist. No. 7 v.
Oregon School Activities Ass'n, 15 Ore. App. 185, 515 P.2d 431 (1973); Eggert v. City
of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973); cf. Karp v. Collins, 310 F. Supp.
627, 634 (D.N.J. 1970); In re Barcomb, 132 Vt. 225, 234, 315 A.2d 476, 482 (1974).
Other courts have concluded that a constitutionally protected right to travel intrastate
does not exist. E.g., Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); cf. Abrahams v. Civil Sere.
Comm'n, 65 NJ. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974).
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tion whether the compelling interest test is applicable only at the
state level, or whether a compelling local interest can justify local
legislation that penalizes the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right.18
The extent to which zoning ordinances and other land-use planning
legislation may infringe the right to travel has not been finally decided.'
16. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.NJ. 1972), upheld an ordinance that
required police and firemen to live in the municipality in which they worked. The court
stated that there were compelling state interests justifying the ordinance. Arguably, the
court meant that there were compelling local interests. Since the ordinance restricted
the right of city employees to live in one area rather than another within the state, the
right with which the court was concerned was necessarily a right of intrastate move-
ment.
If a right of intrastate travel does exist, then it follows that the compelling interest
test should be applicable on the local as well as the state level; presumably, local legisla-
tion like the ordinance in Krzewinski, which touches upon the right of intrastate move-
ment, should be justifiable upon a showing of compelling local interest. Nevertheless,
residence requirements for municipal employment like the one in Krzewinski have been
upheld under the more lenient test of whether they bear a rational relationship to a le-
gitimate state interest. E.g., Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d
483 (1974); Mereadante v. City of Paterson, III N.J. Super. 35, 266 A.2d 611 (Ch.
1970), af 'd, 58 N.J. 112, 275 A.2d 440 (1971); Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J.
178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Gould v. Bennett, 153 Misc. 818, 276 N.Y.S. 113 (Sup. Ct.
1934); see 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 250.
17. It may be argued that occasional language regarding the impermissibility of ex-
clusionary purposes refers implicitly to the right to travel. The fact, however, that such
language often appears in connection with traditional zoning-purpose language suggests
that it simply reflects the proposition that exclusion is not a proper zoning purpose. See,
e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
533, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 393 Pa. 62, 95, 141 A.2d 851, 867 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Board of County
Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 661, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1959); cf. Bristow v. City
of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 217-18, 192 N.W.2d 322, 327 (1971); Bilbar Constr.
Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, supra at 76, 141 A.2d at 858 (majority
opinion).
A few cases concerning housing have been decided on right-to-travel grounds, but
these dealt with durational residence requirements for eligibility for public housing.
Demiragh v. DeVos, 476 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1973); King v. Municipal Housing Author-
ity, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir.
1970). King and Cole applied the Shapiro rationale to invalidate ordinances that condi-
tioned eligibility to apply for public housing on prior residency of five and two years
respectively. Demiragh concerned a scheme by which the city indirectly sought to al-
leviate a housing crisis by requiring one year of residence in order to qualify for welfare.
Striking down the requirement on right-to-travel grounds, the court stated that the city
may not wall out the poor in order to solve its housing problems. 476 F.2d at 405-
06.
Another court, however, faced with a public housing ordinance with a one-year resi-
dence requirement for eligibility, upheld the ordinance. Lane v. McGarry, 320 F. Supp.
562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). It distinguished Shapiro on the ground that, unlike welfarehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/17
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Municipal land-use ordinances traditionally have been judged accord-
ig to due process standards18 or under the provisions of state constitu-
tions, home rule charters, or enabling legislation19 empowering the mu-
nicipality to provide for the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare.2" In the recent case of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,2' the
Supreme Court upheld a municipal zoning ordinance that restricted the
number of unrelated persons who could live together as a household; the
Court summarily dismissed the right-to-travel issue. Responding to
plaintiffs' argument that the ordinance violated the equal protection
clause, the Court found that it did not create a classification that in-
fringed their right to travel or any other fundamental right.22 Thus, the
ordinance fell into the category of economic and social legislation sub-
ject to review under the more lenient test of whether it bore a rational
relation to the permissible municipal objectives that it sought to achieve.
Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma presented "for
checks, housing had physical limitations. The court held that the classification created
by the residence requirement had a reasonable basis and furthered the policy of the
United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1970, Supp. III, 1973), by
vesting maximum responsibility in local housing agencies for administration of the low-
rent housing program and by encouraging employment through preferential treatment to
those with jobs and roots in Syracuse. The court announced its disagreement with the
decision in Cole, which had recently been handed down. 320 F. Supp. at 564.
18. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954); Concord Township Appeal,
439 Pa. 466, 470 n.1, 268 A.2d 765, 766 n.1 (1970); Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 241
n.3, 263 A.2d 395, 397 n.3 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township
Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 522 & n.20, 215 A.2d 597, 607 & n.20 (1966); Bilbar
Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 72, 141 A.2d 851,
856 (1958).
19. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926);
Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 369-70, 285 N.E.2d 291, 296-97, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138, 145 (1972). For a general discussion of sources of local governmental power see
MANMDFLKER 95-143.
20. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926);
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 530,
215 A.2d 597, 611 (1966); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment,
393 Pa. 62, 72, 141 A.2d 851, 856 (1958); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200
Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959). Euclid set the precedent for extreme judicial
deference to the legislative judgment when zoning ordinances are at issue. "If the valid-
ity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra
at 388. See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. East-
town Township Bd. of Adjustment, supra at 71, 141 A.2d at 856. For a discussion of
the exercise of the zoning power see MANDELxR 571-687, 893-1012, 1033-149.
21. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
22. Id. at 7.
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the first time [the issue] whether or not a municipality may claim the
specific right to keep others away. '2 3 In support of its conclusions that
no governmental unit has that right and that the exercise of the claimed
right violates the right to travel of the excluded persons, the court set out
in detail its findings of fact.24 It found that Petaluma experienced rapid
growth during the 1960's and early 1970's, and that continuation of that
growth trend would result in a population of 77,000 by 1985.25 In 1971,
in response to growing community sentiment favoring the limitation of
future growth, the city council adopted the Petaluma Plan, including the
numerical limitation on new housing units and the urban extension
line.26 By applying "density limitation and other techniques" to the area
within the urban extension line, the city set a prospective maximum pop-
ulation level of 55,000 by 1985.27 Further, although the city contended
that the plan was to last only until 1977, official attempts had been made
to extend the plan through 1990, not only by making the 500-unit limi-
tation and the urban extension line effective for twenty years, but also by
limiting available water and sewage treatment facilities. 28 The court
found that the Petaluma Plan had prevented or would prevent construc-
tion of from one-half to two-thirds of the new housing units demanded
by market and demographic forces during the period from 1973 to
1977 .2  Since the city had solicited the cooperation of the county and
the Local Agency Formation Commission in preventing residential de-
23. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 587 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, Civil No. 74-2100 (9th Cir., Aug. 13, 1975); see
note 5 supra.
24. Id. at 575-81.
25. Id. at 575.
26. See text accompanying note 2 supra. The urban extension line was planned to
contribute not only to the geographical containment of the city, but also to the preserva-
tion of its surrounding open spaces. To this end, it consisted in part of a 200-foot-wide
"greenbelt" along the eastern edge of the city. Brief for Plaintiffs at 45, Construction
Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974). For a criticism
of the use of open space to control growth, see W. Wn'TE, THE LAsT LANDscAP 152
(1968). See generally MANDELKER 1124-28.
27. 375 F. Supp. at 576.
28. Specifically, the city had contracted with its major water supplier through the
year 1990 for a daily water flow sufficient only to supply the needs of a population of
55,000, although the city could expand its contract by request. In addition, the sewage
treatment plant was limited to handling two million gallons of sewage a day, although
it was capable of being expanded to handle up to 14 million gallons a day and would
at all times be adequate to the demands placed on it by population growth at market
and demographic rates. Id. at 577-78.
29. Id. at 577.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/17
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velopment in the area outside the urban extension line, the plan inhibit-
ed immigration into Petaluma and the surrounding area. °
The remainder of the court's findings constituted a "cumulative im-
pact" analysis31 of "the probable effects of the growth limitation policy
in dispute and the probable effects if such a policy were to spread to the
remaining municipalities of the San Francisco metropolitan region. 3 2
The court based its discussion on the initial finding that in a self-con-
tained metropolitan region with a unitary housing market, 88 persons ex-
30. Id. at 576.
31. The cumulative impact test was developed to measure the burden placed on in-
terstate commerce by local and state regulation. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
(1946); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S.
761 (1945).
Plaintiffs in Petaluma had argued that the Petaluma Plan was a burden on commerce
as well as a violation of the right to travel. Brief for Plaintiffs at 40-42, Construction
Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Consequently,
some of the court's findings concerned the effect of the Petaluma Plan on interstate com-
merce, although these findings were not necessary to support the result. Thus, the court
stated that "the limit on population set up by the 'urban extension line' would. . . act
as a substantial deterrent to travel and commerce." 375 F. Supp. at 576. It also found
that "[hlousing in Petaluma and elsewhere in the San Francisco metropolitan region is
produced substantially through goods, services and communication devices in interstate
commerce." Id. at 577. And, "[i]f . . . growth centers curtail residential growth to
less than demographic and market rates, as has been attempted in the present case, seri-
ous and damaging dislocation will occur in the housing market, the commerce it repre-
sents, and in the travel and settlement of people in need and in search of housing." Id.
at 579.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court's decision, Yee
note 5 supra, reached the merits of the argument and held that there was no violation of
the commerce clause. The Petaluma Plan was characterized as "a reasonable and
legitimate exercise of the police power" that "does not discriminate against interstate
commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity," and therefore is not an un-
reasonable burden upon it. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, Civil No.
74-2100 (9th Cir., Aug. 13, 1975) at 16, 17; see note 48 infra.
In their brief on appeal, plaintiffs (appellees) argue that cumulative impact is an ap-
propriate and useful test by which to judge exclusionary zoning ordinances: "The cumu-
lative impact test in land-use cases holds promise not only of penalizing cities attempting
unreasonable controls, but also of legitimizing land-use regulations that can be shown
to be of minor or negligible local and regional impact on mobility." Brief for Appellees
at 98, Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, Civil No. 74-2100 (9th Cir., Aug.
13, 1975). This argument theoretically is not precluded by the court of appeals' de-
cision on the commerce clause issue, since it does not rest on the commerce clause but
merely borrows the cumulative impact test from the commerce clause cases as a method
for approaching land-use issues.
32. 375 F. Supp. at 578.
33. 'The metropolitan housing market is a unitary market in the sense that each
unit tends to substitute for all others and constraints in one part of the region have ira-Washington University Open Scholarship
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cluded from one suburb seek housing elsewhere in the region. Other
suburbs respond to the increased population burden thrust upon them
by adopting their own exclusionary measures.34 Regionwide exclusion-
ary measures that limit housing supply in the face of rising demand tend
to increase sale and rental costs and prevent replacement of substandard
and obsolete housing stock. The court reasoned that if people who nor-
mally would move into better housing as their incomes increase are un-
able to find new housing, the "filtration" of older housing down to peo-
ple with lower incomes ceases. Consequently, substandard and obsolete
housing that has filtered to the bottom of the market and would normally
be replaced remains in the market because its occupants are unable to
find other housing.3"
The aggregate effect of a proliferation of the "Petaluma Plan"
throughout the San Francisco region would be a decline in regional
housing stock quality, a loss of the mobility of current and prospective
residents and a deterioration in the quality and choice of housing avail-
able to income earners with real incomes of $14,000 per year or less. 36
Applying the Shapiro rule to the above facts, the court stated that
since
"there was no meaningful distinction between a law which 'penalizes'
the exercise of a right and one which denies it altogether, it [was] clear
that the growth limitation under attack [could] be defended only insofar
as it further[ed] a compelling state interest. '37
In response to the city's first argument, that protection of its allegedly
inadequate water and sewage treatment facilities was a compelling in-
terest, the court pointed to its findings that the facilities were adequate
and could be expanded.38 Since the city had intentionally restricted its
facilities with reference to a future population projected on the basis of
pacts elsewhere in the region." Brief for Appellees at 73, Construction Indus. Ass'n v.
City of Petaluma, Civil No. 74-2100 (9th Cir., Aug. 13, 1975).
34. 375 F. Supp. at 578-79.
35. Id. at 579-81.
36. Id. at 581. Households with incomes of from $8,000 to $14,000 are those who
would normally move into "threshold" housing, the least expensive housing available
without government subsidy. Threshold housing would be the housing most affected by
the proliferation of exclusionary land-use plans. There would be a corresponding reduc-
tion in "filtration" housing, i.e. housing vacated by those moving into threshold housing,
available to households with incomes of $8,000 or less, hence the finding of the impact
of a proliferation of "Petaluma Plans" on households with incomes of under $14,000.
Id.
37. Id. at 582.
38. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1975:234]
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limited growth, protection of inadequate facilities could not constitute
a compelling interest justifying the city's growth limitation.80
The balance of the court's opinion dealt with the city's final argument
that, because it had the power to zone, it had the right to zone for growth
control, and that "its citizens' desires to protect its 'small town character'
[were] sufficiently compelling reasons to justify the exclusionary ordi-
nances."4 0 The court rejected that argument, relying on language in a
recent series of Pennsylvania cases41 that suggests that municipalities
may not barricade themselves against a numerically and geographically
expanding population.42 The court adopted the reasoning of these cases
as best expressing the underlying rationale of right-to-travel decisions.
39. 375 F. Supp. at 582-83. The court also applied the rule that when reasonable
alternative means that interfere less with constitutionally protected rights are available
to achieve state objectives, those alternative means must be used. Id.; see, e.g., Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). Reasonable alternatives to growth limitation
included expansion of the sewage treatment plant and the ability of the city to request
more water from its supplier. 375 F. Supp. at 583.
40. 375 F. Supp. at 583.
41. Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh Appeal,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township
Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown
Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
42. Faced with the absence of direct precedent on the question of the legality of
an absolute numerical limitation on population, the Petaluma court took its cue from
the general concepts expressed in the majority opinion in Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941). See note 6 supra.
The most important of the Pennsylvania cases for the Petaluma opinion was National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965), which invalidated a four-acre minimum lot size requirement on the ground that
its primary purpose was to exclude newcomers. The Pennsylvania court made clear that
a possible future burden on city facilities could not justify zoning ordinances that seek
to avoid the responsibilities of population increase; the zoning power is to be used to
plan for the future, not to deny it. Id. at 524-28, 215 A.2d at 608-10. The court further
stated that legislation having as its purpose the preservation of the character or setting
of a town served private, rather than public, interests and therefore could not be upheld
as promoting the general welfare. Id. at 528-32, 215 A.2d at 610-12. The Petaluma
court found the basic rationale for the National Land decision in the following passage:
Four acre zoning represents Easttown's position that it does not desire to ac-
commodate those who are pressing for admittance to the township unless such
admittance will not create any additional burdens upon governmental functions
and services. The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way
of the natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto undevel-
oped areas in search of a comfortable place to live. We have concluded not.
A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of new-
comers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the ad-
ministration of public services and facilities can not be held valid.
Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612, quoted in 375 F. Supp. at 585-86.Washington University Open Scholarship
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The difficulty with applying the Shapiro formulation to the Petaluma
Plan arises from the lack of a manageable equal protection issue. The
compelling state interest test was developed to judge legislative classifica-
tions that discriminate against specific groups of people.4 3 The Supreme
Coure applied the test in Shapiro because the durational residence
requirement 4  created an invidious classification that discriminated
against certain poor people on the basis of their exercise of a fundamen-
tal right."' The Petaluma Plan creates a distinction between those per-
sons who are residents of Petaluma and those who are not but may wish
to be. The latter class, whose members are denied the opportunity to
exercise their "right to migrate" into Petaluma, is theoretically limit-
less.4" It is questionable whether such an undefined "class" provides any
meaningful basis for an equal protection analysis. A further problem is
posed by the suggestion that Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas47 may indi-
43. The Supreme Court has established that suspect or invidious legislative classifi-
cations are subject to rigid judicial scrutiny, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
(1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and place upon the state a "heavy burden of justification," Loving
V. Virginia, supra at 9. The compelling state interest test is an objective standard by
which the court can determine in a given situation whether, upon close scrutiny of the
facts of the case, the state has met its burden of justification. Unless the suspect class-
ification can be upheld under that test, it offends the equal protection clause.
44. Most cases following Shapiro have presented the right-to-travel issue in the con-
text of durational or nondurational residence requirements. See cases cited note 14 su-
pra. For a discussion of the applicability of Shapiro to nondurational residence require-
ments, see 1975 WAsH. U.L.Q. 250, 260.
45. The equal protection clause may be invoked to challenge not only suspect class-
ifications based on personal characteristics such as race, alienage, national origin, and
sex, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973), but also classifications that may
invade or restrain certain fundamental rights, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
46. The district court itself made no mention of any classification giving rise to
an equal protection problem, nor did it recognize the equal protection context in which
the compelling state interest test was announced.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding that the plaintiffs in Petaluma did not
have standing to raise the right-to-travel argument, Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City
of Petaluma, Civil No. 74-2100 (9th Cir., Aug. 13, 1975), and its reliance on Warth v.
Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), to provide the requirements for standing, severely limit
the class of plaintiffs who, at least for purposes of bringing suit, are denied entry into
Petaluma. See note 5 supra. But this disposition of the practical problem of who is a
"proper plaintiff" to challenge the Petaluma Plan does not dispose of the underlying
problems with the rationale inherent in the district court's reliance on Shapiro, since, as
noted in the accompanying text, the application of the Shapiro analysis to the Petaluma
situation creates virtually a limitless class of persons subjected to discrimination, how-
ever that class is cut down for purposes of standing.
47. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/17
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cate that in zoning cases an even more lenient rational relation test ap-
plies than in other equal protection cases.48 In order to base its decision
on the right to travel, the Petaluma court might simply have noted that
the right to travel has been established as a fundamental right.40 It could
then have invalidated the Plan on the strength of the statement in Shapi-
ro that "deterrence of indigents from migrating to the State . . . is
[not] a constitutionally permissible state objective."" °  The Petaluma
Plan admittedly deterred not only indigents but others as well, and pre-
vented migration only into the city and surrounding area rather than into
the state. Nonetheless, it would have been better to invalidate the Plan
directly in this manner, rather than indirectly by means of the Shapiro
equal protection rationale. 51
48. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L REV. 43, 128 (1974). The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion reversing the district court's decision in Petaluma,
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, Civil No. 74-2100 (9th Cir., Aug. 13,
1975), discussed Belle Terre in its analysis of the due process issue raised by the
plaintiffs but not reached by the district court. See note 5 supra. The court of appeals
relied on Belle Terre in holding that Petaluma's "interest in preserving its small town
character and in avoiding uncontrolled and rapid growth falls within the broad concept
of 'public welfare'," id. at 12, and was therefore a "legitimate governmental interest."
Id. at 14. Since the exclusionary purpose and effect of the Petaluma Plan bore a
rational relationship to that legitimate governmental interest, it was a valid exercise of
the police power, was not arbitrary and unreasonable, and did not violate the duo
process clause. Id. at 11-15. Thus the court of appeals' opinion falls squarely within
the tradition of judicial deference to legislative judgment in zoning matters. See note
20 aupra. It may, however, be inconsistent with the approach taken in United States
v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2656. In
Black Jack a zoning ordinance was struck down on the ground that "it deniefd] persons
housing on the basis of race, in violation of § 3604(a) [of the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970)], and interferes with the exercise of the right to equal
housing opportunity, in violation of § 3617." The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that "Lilt having been established that the ordinance had a discriminatory
effect, it follows that the United States had made out a prima facie case under [the
Fair Housing Act], and the burden shifted to the City to demonstrate that a compelling
governmental interest was furthered by that ordinance." Id. at 1186 (emphasis added).
The statutory basis for the Black Jack decision may, however, lessen its significance for
other kinds of zoning cases.
49. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall
v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
50. 394 U.S. at 633.
51. It may be argued that this criticism is an irrelevant exercise in logical acrobatics
since the essential factor in the case is that the Petaluma Plan in fact impinged on the
exercise of a fundamental right. In response, however, it need only be pointed out that,
in applying the Shapiro rationale to the facts of Petaluma, the court also failed to con-Washington University Open Scholarship
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Such an approach would also avoid the problems inherent in the
court's reliance on the Pennsylvania cases to support its right-to-travel
argument. One commentator has pointed out that the underlying ration-
ale of those cases is unclear."2 There is no mention of the right to travel in
the opinions; thus, they provide only minimal support for a right-to-
travel decision. An opinion based on the premise that deterrence of mi-
gration is constitutionally prohibited could accomodate as an alternative
ground of decision the proposition in support of which the Pennsylvania
cases might be cited: that the municipal zoning power does not encom-
pass the power to exclude, since exclusion does not promote the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.5 3
sider the additional, and not insignificant, question whether there is a right of intrastate
travel which may be infringed upon a showing of compelling local interest. See notes
15 & 16 supra and accompanying text. The facts in Petaluma clearly required a discus-
sion of this question. The court may have seen the problem and attempted to avoid
it by finding that the persons who "were and will be forced to turn [from Petaluma]
to other areas within the region for accommodation. . . . consist of Californians as well
as out-of-state immigrants." 375 F. Supp. at 577 (emphasis added). While the inclu-
sion of this finding in the court's opinion may serve to support the argument that the
Petaluma Plan inhibits interstate travel, the finding does not answer whether a compel-
ling local interest can justify that infringement. Nor does it bring the case within the
ambit of Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). In Memorial Hos-
pital it was a state statute that set up the county residence requirement. See note 15
supra.
If the Petaluma court was seeking to base its decision on the right to travel and
thereby avoid the negative implications of Belle Terre for the role of equal protection
in municipal zoning cases, see text accompanying note 48 supra, Shapiro was an unfortu-
nate case upon which to rely, for it is essentially an equal protection case. In Belle
Terre, the right to travel was one of the fundamental rights allegedly infringed by the
classification effected by the challenged ordinance. See text following note 21 supra.
Belle Terre, however, is factually distinguishable from Petaluma. The Belle Terre ordi-
nance lent itself to equal protection analysis because it set up two distinct classes of vil-
lage residents, households whose members were related and households whose members
were not related. Petaluma presented a very different situation, to which an equal
protection analysis is not appropriate. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
This is not to deny, however, that the right to travel may provide the most promising
approach to the development of new constitutional standards for land-use planning. See
Comment, The Right to Trmel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use
Regulations?, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1972).
52. Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Required by the Constitution to Consider Re-
gional Needs?, 3 CoNN. L. REV. 244 (1971).
53. See, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment,
419 Pa. 504, 533, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965): "It is clear . . . that the general welfare
is not fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive and exclu-
sionary." Accord, Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 217-18, 192 N.W.
2d 322, 327-28 (1971); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378, 285 N.E.2d 291,
302, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 152 (1972); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/17
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Before its reversal,54 the Petaluma opinion had significant implica-
tions for future comprehensive land-use plans. The decision might
have been used to deny the power, not only of municipalities, but
also--of regional planning agencies, to zone for a population level lower
than that which "market and demographic forces" dictated for a
given area within a region.55 In addition, the opinion suggested that
a city could not use the burden on its facilities as a subterfuge for
limiting population growth, nor could it use the zoning power to pro-
tect its facilities unless they were in immediate and serious danger of
being overburdened by the demands of an increased population. 0
Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 76, 95, 141 A.2d 851, 858, 867 (1958) (majority and dissenting
opinions); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 661, 107 S.E.2d 390,
396 (1959); see Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super.
11, 20-21, 283 A.2d 353, 358 (L Div. 1971). One writer has taken an innova-
tive approach to exclusionary zoning and has postulated a constitutional right of
outsiders to have their interests considered by local zoning bodies. Walsh, supra note
52.
54. See note 5 supra.
55. A recent article has discussed this aspect of the Petaluma decision with respect
to city and town planning.
One conclusion to be drawn from Petaluma is that a town cannot "stand in
the way" of population growth; that it must absorb its "share"--based upon
"reasonable forecasts" of the various growth pressures in the region. This su-
gests that now a town must respond to the dictates of the market (demographic
demands, etc.)-regardless of what it feels may be sound planning.
Such statemnints of law also inevitably raise questions as to whether the fore-
casts are correct, and whose forecasts should be used. (Example: what if the
forecasts of the developer, the town, and/or the regional agency of the state
differ significantly?) How is the necessary local pre-planning to be enforced?
What if the region claims that the town is a "growth center," and the city
claims the development should not take place in this direction? Who will be
the arbiter of disagreements?
Scott, The No-Growth Explosion and Petaluma: Government Must Respond to "Demo-
graphic & Market Growth Rates," URAN LAND, June 1974, at 20, 23. The author
suggests that regional planning may provide a solution to the problem.
One possible resolution to the above issue may be that a town or city will
no longer be able to unilaterally proceed to plan in its own way-that more
and more, towns' comprehensive plans will fall if challenged-unless it [sic]
is in agreement with overall regional planning and forecasts of various regional
housing needs.
Id. This suggested solution assumes that the Petaluma opinion poses no problem for
regional planning that attempts to redirect "market and demographic forces." Arguably,
a regional planning agency could prohibit development in environmentally endangered
areas under the compelling interest test, but it is questionable whether it may also limit
"natural" development in other areas for valid, but nonnecessary, environmental reasons.
But cf. CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, - Cal. App. 3d -,
118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974). It has been suggested that a local municipality also may
plan unilaterally for environmental protection. Scott, supra.
56. Accord, Lakeland Bluff v. County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 278, 252 N.E.2d
248 [Vol. 1975:234
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It should be noted, however, that given the proper plaintiffs in a sub-
sequent case, the district court's opinion in Petaluma would have some
precedential significancc.1 7
The problems raised by exclusionary local planning strategies in the
face of an expanding population suggest that the approach taken in
the Petaluma opinion should be further explored.5 The shortcomings
of the opinion, however, and the difficulty of finding plaintiffs with
standing to challenge such strategies59 threaten the opinion's effec-
tiveness in contributing to the development of judicial standards ap-
plicable to modem land-use planning issues.
765, 770 (1969); Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of S. Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424,
244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Town-
ship Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965); see Golden v.
Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 383, 285 N.E.2d 291, 304-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 156
(1972); Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 256, 167 N.Y.S.2d
343, 845 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 516-17,
116 N.W. 2d 816, 820 (1962). Golden may suggest a way around this problem. It
upheld the Ramapo Plan which paced municipal development according to the expansion
of city facilities. The Ramapo Plan has been severely criticized, however, and the dis-
senting judge in Golden disagreed with the majority's determination that the plan was not
exclusionary in purpose or effect. Having noted the constitutional and policy issues
raised by recent land-use cases and the critical need for an enlarged kind of land planning
to meet the problems created by urban growth, 30 N.Y.2d at 383-85, 285 N.E.2d at 305-
06, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156-58, he concluded nonetheless that Ramapo's scheme went be-
yond what local governments may presently do.
inhere is no doubt that the Ramapos, in isolation, cannot solve their prob-
lems alone, legally, under existing laws, or socially, politically, or economic-
ally. For the time being, the Ramapos must do what they can with district
zoning and subdivision platting control. They may not declare moratoria on
growth and development for as much as a generation. They may not sep-
arately or in concert impair the freedom of movement or residence of those
outside their borders, even by ingenious schemes. Nor is it important whether
their intention is to exclude, if that is the effect of their arrogated powers.
id. at 391, 285 N.E.2d at 310, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
It has also been suggested that the Ramapo Plan, by delaying urban development
within the town, might contribute to unplanned development elsewhere and exaggerate
the trend toward megalopolitan sprawl. Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a
Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. Rnv. 234, 250 (1973).
57. See note 5 supra.
58. As noted above, see note 5 supra, the reversal of the decision does not preclude
a proper party from basing a challenge to an exclusionary zoning ordinance on the
right to travel.
59. See note 5 supra.
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